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“IN THE FIELD”
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIAN
CONTRACTORS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES DURING A
CONTINGENCY OPERATION FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED OUTSIDE OF
AN AREA OF ACTUAL FIGHTING
Jesse A. Ouellette1

Introduction
The United States continues to rely heavily on government contractors to supplement
work previously undertaken solely by the armed forces during times of conflict.2 Our reliance on
contractors has steadily increased post-9/11 with Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring
Freedom, and the overall War on Terror.3 Indeed, we will likely continue to rely on contractors to
accompany our armed forces overseas during conflicts for the near future.4 This unconventional way
of war fighting raises questions surrounding the ability of commanders to subject contractors, who
are accompanying military units “in the field,” to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
This paper will present the argument that the language “in the field” appearing in Article 2(a)(10) of
the UCMJ should be understood to encompass anywhere that war operations may be involved and
not be limited to “an area of actual fighting.”5
1 Jesse A. Ouellette, Second Lieutenant, United States Marine Corps and third year law student at The American
University Washington College of Law. 2011 Graduate of Iona College with a B.A. in Political Science and a dual minor
in pre-law and philosophy. I would like to thank the editorial staff of The National Security Law Brief for their excellent
work and devotion to the Brief ’s mission – in particular Caitlin Marchand, Phil Sholts, and Christopher Rogers for
their invaluable feedback and help making this article publishable, Associate Dean Steven Vladeck for his insight and
constructive criticism, my family, and my fiancé Nicole for their endless support and encouragement.
2 See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Contractor Personnel Authorized To Accompany U.S.
Armed Forces, 73 Fed. Reg. 16764-01 (proposed Mar. 31, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. Pts. 212, 225, and 252)
(providing for authorization of contractors to accompany U.S. armed forces deployed outside of the United States
(U.S.)). See generally Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to
Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (March 17,
2013) (showing the Department of Defense’s historical employment of military contractors in all areas of operations).
3 See generally, Stephen M. Blizzard, Increasing Reliance of Contractors on the Battlefield: How Do We Keep From Crossing
The Line?, 2004 Logistics Dimensions Vol. 2., Aug. 2004, at 142 (explaining that while the use of military contractors
dates to the 16th century, the abundance of their use in current operations is unprecedented).
4 See generally Joel Mathis, Blackwater, Private Military Contractors Under Fort Leavenworth Scrutiny, Lawrence
Journal-World (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www2.ljworld.com/weblogs/military_matters/2007/oct/11/fort/ (describing the
U.S. military’s dependence on private contractors for the foreseeable future).
5 See 10 U.S.C. § 802 Art. 2(a)(10) (2009) (“the following persons are subject to this chapter . . . in time of declared
war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field”) (emphasis added);
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In 2007, Senator Lindsey Graham, who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee,
introduced an amendment to Article 2(a)(10), that provides for “persons serving with or
accompanying the armed forces” to be subject to its jurisdiction, not only during a time of “declared
war” but also during a “contingency operation.”6 The legislation was largely introduced given the fact
that Congress has not officially declared war since June of 1942,7 a technicality that left a loophole
for Article 2(a)(10) applicability to “persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field”8 in modern conflicts.9
In United States v. Ali, a 2012 case heard by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF), the court tried a non-citizen military contractor for an alleged crime under the UCMJ
while he was accompanying the Army ”in the field” during a deployment in Iraq.10 In answering the
challenge to the court-martial jurisdiction, the CAAF held that jurisdiction was legitimate under
Article 2(a)(10) in part because Ali was accompanying the armed forces “in the field.”11 Furthermore,
the court was able to hold that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections did not apply to Ali
given his lack of substantial connections with the United States.12
Unlike Ali, this paper will analyze whether a United States citizen serving as a contractor
with the United States armed forces, outside of the United States and its territories during a
contingency operation, may fall under the jurisdiction of the UCMJ for a crime committed outside
of an “area of actual fighting,” but nevertheless “in the field,” pursuant to Article 2(a)(10).13 Part I
of this paper will review how courts have interpreted Article 2(a)(10), specifically looking at the “in
time of declared war or a contingency operation . . . persons serving with or accompanying . . . [and
the] in the field” requirements.14 An analysis of the former two requirements will allow a greater
understanding of the context of the latter. Furthermore, Part I will conclude that the “in the field”
requirement, considering the context of Article 2(a)(10), includes locations not in “the area of actual
fighting.”
Part II will criticize the CAAF’s interpretation of “in the field,” set forth in Ali, as too
narrow.15 Moreover, Part II will argue that an interpretation of “in the field” requiring an “area of
actual fighting” is not only impractical but also severely limits the ability of commanders to maintain
United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (holding that the definition for “in the field” is an “area of actual
fighting”).
6 See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364 § 552 (2006)
(amending 10 U.S.C. § 802 Art. 2(a)(10) by striking “war” and inserting “declared war or a contingency operation”).
7 Official Declarations of War by Congress, Senate Historical Office, available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm.
8 10 U.S.C. § 802 Art. 2(a)(10).
9 See Senate Historical Office, Official Declarations of War by Congress, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm (listing all instances of the United States
officially declaring war).
10 See Ali, 71 M.J. at 259 (explaining that Ali served as an interpreter for a Military Police company serving in Hit,
Iraq).
11 Id. at 264.
12 Id. at 268.
13 Id.
14 See 10 U.S.C. § 802 Art. 2(a)(10).
15 See Ali, 71 M.J. at 264 (adopting the definition of “an area of actual fighting” for “in the field”).
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discipline and mission readiness, with respect to contractors, during operations “in the field.” In
addition to criticism of the Ali interpretation, Part II will discuss the potential negative repercussions
of a broader understanding of “in the field” from the obvious denial of Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights to the potential for misuse of jurisdictional power from commanding officers. Part II will
conclude that application of a cost-benefit analysis will show that a broader interpretation of “in the
field” is needed, despite the potential negative consequences, to fulfill the purpose of Article 2(a)(10)
with respect to maintaining unit discipline and readiness.16
Part III will emphasize the constitutional justifications of a broader interpretation of “in the
field” by interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s exception clause pertaining to cases “arising in the land
or naval forces” as applicable not only to members of the armed forces but also to all “person[s]”
should their actions create cases “arising in the land and naval forces.”17 Furthermore, Part III will
present the argument that “cases arising in the land or naval forces” encompasses areas “in the
field” not just the “area of actual fighting.”18 Part III will conclude that Congress’ constitutional
war powers, along with its power to make rules governing the land and naval forces, and the Fifth
Amendment exception to a trial by jury allow for a broader definition of “in the field,” and that a
broader definition will justify the UCMJ’s jurisdiction as opposed to trial in an Article III court.
I. The Uniform Code Of Military Justice Article 2(a)(10)
Although Article 2(a)(10) was formally implemented in the 1950s, the concept of trying
civilians accompanying the armed forces in the field is not new.19 Indeed, contractors have been
accompanying our nation’s armed forces in the field dating back to the Revolutionary War, and
the 1775 Articles of War gave military tribunal jurisdiction to non-military personnel serving with
the Continental Army “in the field.”20 In the 1950s, Congress replaced the Articles of War with the
UCMJ and included within it Article 2(a)(10).21 Article 2(a)(10) gives UCMJ jurisdiction to, “in
time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field.”22
A. In Time of Declared War or a Contingency Operation
The language “in time of declared war,” which appeared in the original version of the
16 See William Winthrop, Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents 48–49 (2d ed. 1920) (describing courtsmartial and acknowledging the President’s power to as Commander-in-Chief to maintain discipline within the military).
17 U.S. Const. amend. V.
18 U.S. Const. amend. V.
19 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Del. Consulting Group, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.ucmj.us/about-ucmj.
shtml (explaining that the Articles of War governed the military until 1951 when the UCMJ was passed); see generally,
Blizzard, supra note 2, at 161 (explaining that the use of military contractors dates back to the 17th century).
20 See Steven P. Cullen, Out of Reach: Improving the System to Deter and Address Criminal Acts Committed by Contractor
Employees Accompanying Armed Forces Overseas, 38 Pub. Cont. L.J. 509, 519 (2009) (noting that the judicially system
has also historically contemplated extending military justice to civilians accompanying the armed forces).
21 See Del. Consulting Group, supra note 19.
22 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
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UCMJ, created a very limited area of applicability and lacked foresight into the United States’
military conflicts that would arise in the latter part of the 20th century.23 In United States v. Averette,
the Court of Military Appeals held that the Article 2(a)(10) language “in a time of declared war”
meant a war officially declared by Congress under its Article 1, § 8 power.24 Averette was a civilian
tried under the UCMJ during the Vietnam conflict that was never officially declared a war by
Congress; therefore, the court held that he could not be subject to UCMJ jurisdiction.25 Recognizing
this loophole, and the tendency of the United States to get itself involved in years long military
campaigns that were never officially declared wars, in 2007 Congress added “or a contingency
operation” to the existing Article 2(a)(10) language.26
Although the 2007 amendment to Article 2(a)(10) did not alter the “in the field” language,
it is relevant to discuss because its absence would render the rest of the sentence irrelevant with
respect to recent and likely future conflicts.27 The “in time of declared war or contingency operation”
language extends the ambiguity of the boundaries of what is considered “in the field.”28 While similar
questions remain, a contingency operation is arguably murkier when it comes to defining “in the
field” than declared wars have been historically.29 The conflicts the United States finds itself in today
often do not have a battlefield or uniformed enemy.30 These facts alone make setting a boundary
to what is considered “in the field” difficult at the least.31 However, adopting a more flexible
interpretation, while not changing the definition, would allow commanders to put mission readiness
and discipline before all else. Such an interpretation may provide for “in the field” to encompass:
any foreign location, while deployed with a military unit, during a contingency operation, where
detainment or export for trial by an Article III court would be impractical, unnecessary, or otherwise
hinder the objective of the mission.

23 See Cullen, supra note 20, at 523 (describing the obstacle raised in Averette of most U.S. military conflicts not being
officially declared wars and the reform of Article 2(a)(10) as a solution).
24 See United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (1970) (holding that “for a civilian to be triable by court-martial
in ‘time of war,’ Article 2(10) means a war formally declared by Congress”).
25 See id.
26 See 109 Pub. L.No. 364 § 552.
27 See generally Cullen, supra note 20, at 514 (illustrating U.S. dependence on military contractors currently and in the
future).
28 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
29 See 10 U.S.C. § 101 (2013) (defining contingency operation broadly as “(A) . . . an operation in which members
of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the
United States or against an opposing military force; or (B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of
members of the uniformed services . . . .”); see also Joseph Romero, Of War and Punishment: “Time of War” in Military
Jurisprudence and A Call for Congress to Define Its Meaning, 51 Naval L. Rev. 1, 52 (2005) (“[t]he wars of the future will
likely take on more untraditional characteristics [from those of the past] as the [Global War on Terror] carries forth.”).
30 See generally Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 Vand.
J. Transnat’l L. 683, 687–88 (2009) (discussing the issue of modern combatants who do not distinguish themselves as
combatants through traditional means such as uniforms or insignia).
31 See id.
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B. Serving With or Accompanying
Courts have been relatively clear as to what constitutes “serving with or accompanying the
armed forces.”32 In Ali, the CAAF held that:
[T]he ‘test is whether [the accused] has moved with a military
operation and whether his presence with the armed force was not
merely incidental, but directly connected with, or dependent upon,
the activities of the armed force or its personnel’ . . . ‘an accused may
be regarded as ‘accompanying’ or ‘serving with’ an armed force, even
though he is not directly employed by such a force or the Government,
but, instead, works for a contractor engaged on a military’ project.33
Admittedly, there are practical limits to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction.34
For example, even in an area of military hostilities, the UCMJ cannot reach employees, or more
relevantly, contractors of other government agencies when said agencies are not assigned to and
serving with the military.35 Nor does the UCMJ provide jurisdiction over civilian contractors, or any
person accompanying the armed forces during peace time.36 However, commanders likely need not
concern themselves with the mission readiness and discipline of other government agencies that may
be working in the same area as the military during an overseas deployment but not assigned to them.
Likewise, subjecting contractors to the UCMJ during peace time does not provide the same benefits
as it does during war time, or a contingency operation.37 Such agencies are not under the command
of military officers and the actions of their employees are jurisdictionally separate from the armed
forces.38
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act includes dependents among others, as
persons subject to the UCMJ.39 However, for the purposes of this analysis, contractors and civilian
32 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F 2012) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 34 n. 61 (1957));
see also United States v. Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98, 110 (C.M.A. 1956) (finding that “persons serving with or accompanying
the armed forces . . . must be subject to control by the services and to trial by court-martial”).
33 See Ali, 71 M.J. at 263.
34 See generally Cullen, supra note 20, at 530 (stating that “[O]ne additional shortcoming of using the UCMJ to
address contractor employee crimes is its limitation to persons ‘serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field’
. . . even in an area of military hostilities, jurisdiction under UCMJ article 2(a) does not reach to other U.S. government
agencies . . . nor does UCMJ jurisdiction cover contract employees working under contract to non-military agencies . . .
the UCMJ could not be used as an effective tool to address crimes committed by contractor employees working for other
agencies in an area of military hostilities”).
35 See id.
36 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
37 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (finding that differential treatment is a consequence whether or not the
individual is subject to the Government’s war powers).
38 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(8) (noting the UMCJ does not apply to personnel of other government agencies unless
assigned to and serving with the armed forces).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(1), (c) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2) (2004) (defining accompanying the armed forces
to include: “a dependent of . . . a member of the armed forces . . . a civilian employee . . . or . . . a [Department of
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agencies in an area of military hostilities”).
35 See id.
36 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
37 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (finding that differential treatment is a consequence whether or not the
individual is subject to the Government’s war powers).
38 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(8) (noting the UMCJ does not apply to personnel of other government agencies unless
assigned to and serving with the armed forces).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(1), (c) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2) (2004) (defining accompanying the armed forces
to include: “a dependent of . . . a member of the armed forces . . . a civilian employee . . . or . . . a [Department of
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employees, not dependents of service members, are in query. With respect to the question presented
here, the “serving with or accompanying” language is analyzed in the context of individuals
contracted with the military and serving with them “in the field.”40 Context matters when exploring
the “serving with or accompanying” language.41 Debatably, and in contrast to their civilian
dependent counterparts, contractors may be of a different nature with respect to their significance in
modern military missions.42 Therefore, the ability to court-martial a contractor when she is serving
with or accompanying a unit “in the field” is vital to mission success.43
C. The In The Field Requirement
Courts have been less than clear on a universal understanding of what “in the field” may
include.44 Colonel William Winthrop, famously referred to as the “Blackstone of military law,” described “in the field” to mean within the “theatre of war.”45 Winthrop’s definition is debatably one of
the broadest offered in any attempt to describe the boundaries of “in the field.” Others have not been
so generous; such was the case in Ali, where the CAAF adopted the definition “in the area of actual
fighting” to be sufficient to determine what is considered “in the field.”46 Indeed, there has been little
Defense (DoD)] contractor (including a subcontractor at any tier) or an employee of a DoD contractor (including a
subcontractor at any tier) . . . persons residing with such member, civilian employee, contractor, or contractor employee
outside the United States . . . [and] persons ‘not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation.’”).
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a)(1), (c) (2000). Even an expansive reading of UCMJ jurisdiction would limit jurisdiction
to contractor employees who work under a contract with the military.
41 See generally Katherin J. Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ Criminal Accountability Under the
UCMJ, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1047, 1059 (2010) (advocating for the UCMJ to apply to combat contractors given the unique
services they provide to U.S. forces in modern day contingency operations. Also focusing on several justifications for
UCMJ jurisdiction over said contractors given their status may be akin to mercenaries under international law).
42 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 32 (1957) (stating that “Mrs. Covert and Mrs. Smith had never been members of
the army, had never been employed by the army, had never served in the army in any capacity . . . [t]he mere fact that
these women had gone overseas with their husbands should not reduce the protection the Constitution gives them . . . [t]
here have been a number of decisions in the lower federal courts which have upheld military trial of civilians “performing
services” for the armed forces ‘in the field’ during time of war”) (emphasis added).
43 See generally Cullen, supra note 20, at 530 (describing the essential services that security and support contractors
provide to the armed forces during contingency operations).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (finding “[a]lthough the Supreme Court in Reid
v. Covert analyzed the provisions of Article 2(11), the Court did distinguish and discuss the ”in the field” requirement
of then Article 2(10)”); United States v. Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98, 109 (C.M.A. 1956) (stating “[t]he phrase ‘in the field’
has been taken to imply military operations with a view to an enemy”). Compare McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80
(E.D.V.A. 1943) (holding that a ship transporting goods during wartime was “in the field”) and Hines v. Mikell, 259 F.
28, 34 (4th Cir. 1919) (“We think, in view of the technical and common acceptation of [“in the field”], this question
is not to be determined by the locality in which the army may be found, but rather by the activity in which it may be
engaged at any particular time.”), with Ex parte Falls, 251 F. 415 (D.N.J. 1918) (holding that a civilian cook serving on a
ship which was carrying war supplies was “in the field”) and Ex parte Gerlach, D.C., 247 F. 616, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
45 See Covert, 354 U.S. at 20 n.38; Ali, 71 M.J. at 264 (stating, “Colonel Winthrop broadly defined the phrase to
mean ‘the period and pendency of war and to acts committed in the theater of war’”).
46 See Ali, 71 M.J. at 264 (holding “we see no reason not to adopt this interpretation of ‘in the field,’ which requires an
area of actual fighting, for our analysis of Article 2(a)(10) . . . there is little doubt that 1st Squad was in an area of actual
fighting and thus, in the field”).
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effort to push the limits of a definition of “in the field,” and understandably given the general hesitancy of Article III courts to yield to or expand the jurisdiction of military courts.47 However, there
exists a sufficient body of cases to lend support to the idea that the scope of “in the field” should at
least be widened to foreign and sometimes domestic locations during a time of war or contingency
operation.48
In Hines v. Mikell, a case from the early 20th century, a civilian stenographer employed by
the Army at an army base was charged with violating the laws of war and tried via court-martial.49
Mikell appealed his charges, arguing that he was not subject to military law as the unit he was serving
with was not serving “in the field.”50 On a petition for habeas corpus, the Fourth Circuit held that
restricting the definition of “in the field” to apply only to those directly operating against the enemy
would not be “keeping with the necessities of our military establishment.”51 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that the phrase “in the field” is not “determined by the locality in which the army may be
found, but rather by the activity in which it may be engaged at any particular time.”52 This rationale
undoubtedly gives courts large playing fields in determining what types of activities constitute “in the
field,” as an armed force may be in a locality far from the “area of actual fighting,” but nevertheless
engaged in activities, which constitute “war operations” within the “theatre of war,” a concept
discussed in greater detail in the next section.
The Hines court cited the United States Army Regulations in giving examples of field
operations, even during peace time:
[I]n time of peace a department commander is charged . . . with the
duty of preparing for war all the troops and all the military resources of
his department, and with the administration of all the military affairs
47 See Covert, 354 U.S. at 34–35 (1957) (“The Government urges that the concept ‘in the field’ should be broadened
to reach dependents accompanying the military forces overseas under the conditions of world tension which exist at the
present time . . . . [W]e reject the Government’s argument that present threats to peace permit military trial of civilians
accompanying the armed forces overseas in an area where no actual hostilities are under way. The exigencies which have
required military rule on the battlefront are not present in areas where no conflict exists. Military trial of civilians ‘in the
field’ is an extraordinary jurisdiction and it should not be expanded at the expense of the Bill of Rights.”) (emphasis
added).
48 See United States v. Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98, 126–27 (C.M.A. 1956) (noting the impracticability of providing
indictment by a grand jury and trial for accused persons in foreign countries); see also In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252, 255
(S.D. Ohio 1944) (extending jurisdiction to a merchant seaman who was not a member of the United States armed
forces); see also Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28, 31 (4th Cir. 1919) (defining “field” as “the actual field of operations against
the enemy; not necessarily the immediate field of battle”); see Covert, 354 U.S. at 8 (finding that Article III § 2 applies to
the crime committed outside the jurisdiction of any State “in the district where the offender is apprehended”).
49 See Hines 259 F. 28 at 29 (establishing that civilians can be subject to the jurisdiction of a military court-martial for
working on a military base).
50 See id.
51 See id. at 34 (ruling that “[t]o restrict the term ‘serving with armies of the United States in the field’ to those persons
only who may be employed with an army when immediately operating against the enemy would be a construction not in
accordance with the spirit of our military law, and not in keeping with the necessities of our military establishment”)
(emphasis added).
52 Id.
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of his department . . . [h]e will annually concentrate his tactical division, or
portions thereof, and secure for himself, and his division staff, as much practice
as possible in the actual handling and supply of troops in the field . . . [t]he
object of such inspections is to determine the preparedness of organizations for
war service, and the capacity of brigade commanders and all other officers for
the exercise in the field of command appropriate to their rank. 53
Although Article 2(a)(10), instituted much later than the decision of this case, explicitly rules out
jurisdiction over “persons serving with or accompanying an armed force” during peace time, some
questions remain: would contractors accompanying military units in training during a contingency
operation be considered “in the field” for purposes of Article 2(a)(10)?54 What if the training were
within the United States? Regarding the latter, in Hines, the court is clear: from this statute it
appears that Congress is of the opinion that any portion of the Army confined to field training in the
United States should be treated as “in the field.” There are other statutes almost too numerous to
mention which clearly indicate that troops in cantonments in this country are “in the field.”55
It would seem logical that if military bases inside of the United States are considered “in
the field,” then military bases outside of the United States would certainly qualify as well, especially
given that the availability for trial under an Article III court would presumably be much more
difficult in the latter, and indeed, this is what the court found.56
In United States v. Burney, a 1956 case of a civilian military contractor serving with the Air
Force overseas, the Court of Military Appeals held that the contractor’s trial by court-martial was
constitutional.57 When taking on the definition of “in the field,” the court upheld the definition
set forth in Hines.58 Although debatably “an area of actual fighting” may imply an action, it clearly
limits the scope to a specific location, and therefore does not agree with the finding in Hines.59 If “in
the field” is relevant to activity and not location, the definition adopted by the Ali court not only
falls short of precedent, but also strips commanders of authority to court-martial contractors serving
under their supervision when issues arise outside of an area of actual fighting.60
53 See id. at 31 (emphasis added).
54 See 10 U.S.C. § 802 Article 2(a)(10); Delaware Consulting Group, supra note 19 (explaining that the 101
articles passed by the UCMJ were written over a century before Hines was decided).
55 Hines, 259 F. 28 at 34.
56 See id. at 33 (holding that “those who entered the cantonment took the first step which was to lead them to the
firing line, and they were then as much ‘in the field’ in pursuance of such training as those who were encamped on the
fields of Flanders awaiting orders to enter the engagement”).
57 See United States v. Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98, 127 (C.M.A. 1956) (holding that it is unconstitutional for former
members of the military to be court-martialed).
58 Id. at 109 ( “The phrase ‘in the field’ has been taken to imply military operations with a view to an enemy and
the question of whether an armed force is ‘in the field’ is determined by the activity in which it may be engaged at a
particular time, not by the locality in which it may be found.”) (internal quotations omitted).
59 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 264 (differing from Hines because the Hines court held that the term in the
field applies broadly to any persons of the military or accompanying the military within or without the United States no
matter if actual fighting is occurring).
60 See id. (ruling that “‘in the field’ . . . requires an area of actual fighting”); but see Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98 at 103
(stating that “the phrase ‘in the field’ . . . is determined by the activity in which it may be engaged at a particular time,
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In the 1944 case titled In re Berue, a merchant sailor, contracted with the Army, and serving
aboard a ship, was court-martialed for misbehavior while the vessel was underway on the high
seas.61 The sailor filed for a writ of habeas corpus which was heard by the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.62 The court denied the writ and dismissed the sailor’s
petition, holding the court-martial lawful.63 In part of the court’s opinion, it cited a 1917 case, Ex
parte Gerlach, in its definition of “in the field” as “any place, whether on land or water, apart from
permanent cantonments or fortifications, where military operations are being conducted.”64
Although the “apart from permanent cantonments or fortifications” language was
distinguished by Ex parte Mikell, and later overturned by Hines, the rest of the language remains
valid precedent.65 Surely any place on land or water where military operations are being conducted
includes “areas of actual fighting,” but it often includes areas where no fighting is occurring at all.66
Indeed, the military engages in operations on land and water when it administers humanitarian aid,
conducts training, mapping, exploration, testing of equipment, and routine patrols; none of these
exercises fall into an area of “actual fighting” although they may occur during a time of declared “war
or a contingency operation.”67 Examples such as the latter demonstrate how the court in Ali sets
too narrow a definition for “in the field.” Adopting the Ali definition leaves no speedy and effective
remedy when civil and criminal issues arise in all areas where “actual fighting” and practical access to
Article III courts is virtually non-existent.68
Furthermore, given the understanding of “in the field” as set forth in Gerlach, Hines, and
not by the locality in which it may be found”) (citing Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir. 1919)).
61 See In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252, 254 (S.D. Ohio 1944) (during the voyage on the high seas, the petitioner had an
incident with officers and members of the crew, resulting in him being placed in chains and demoted).
62 Id.
63 See id. at 256 (finding the court-martial was lawful since the petitioner was “accompanying or serving with the
Armies of the United States in the field”).
64 See id. at 255 (explaining that “in the field” refers to “any place, whether on land or water, apart from permanent
cantonments or fortifications, where military operations are being conducted”) (citing Ex Parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616, 617
(1917)).
65 See Ex parte Mikell, 253 F. 817 (E.D.S.C. 1918) (stating that “in the field” does not include areas thousands of
miles removed and where there is no military conflict); Hines, 259 F. 28 (holding that the term “in the field” may only be
determined by the scope of activity that is being engaged in and not by the locality).
66 See U.S., Australian Joint Forces to Conduct Talisman Saber Exercise, U.S. Pac. Fleet Pub. Aff., July 9, 2013, http://
www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/010131 (describing a joint military exercise carried out by U.S. and Australian forces, in a
field training area, outside of an area of actual fighting).
67 10 U.S.C. § 802 Article 2(a)(10); see Navy Sub Mapping Arctic Ocean Seafloor, Envtl. News Network (July 1,
1998) http://www.cnn.com/TECH/science/9807/01/arctic.yoto/ (illustrating a U.S. Navy expedition to map Arctic
Ocean seabed which will provide scientists with three-dimensional images); see also Barbra Starr, General Asks for U.S.
Warships in Typhoon Relief, CNN, Nov. 13, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/12/us/philippines-typhoon-aid/index.
html (describing the U.S. Marines’ humanitarian aid mission following typhoon Hayian in 2013 to provide shelter,
food, water, and sanitation to thousands of displaced people); French, US Forces Detain 12 Suspected Somali Pirates,
NDTV, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/french-us-forces-detain-12-suspected-somali-pirates-314936
(highlighting a U.S. warship’s presence off the Somali coast to patrol, deter, and if necessary, detain suspected enemy
pirates).
68 See Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 264 (defining “in the field” as “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field
during a contingency operation”).
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of his department . . . [h]e will annually concentrate his tactical division, or
portions thereof, and secure for himself, and his division staff, as much practice
as possible in the actual handling and supply of troops in the field . . . [t]he
object of such inspections is to determine the preparedness of organizations for
war service, and the capacity of brigade commanders and all other officers for
the exercise in the field of command appropriate to their rank. 53
Although Article 2(a)(10), instituted much later than the decision of this case, explicitly rules out
jurisdiction over “persons serving with or accompanying an armed force” during peace time, some
questions remain: would contractors accompanying military units in training during a contingency
operation be considered “in the field” for purposes of Article 2(a)(10)?54 What if the training were
within the United States? Regarding the latter, in Hines, the court is clear: from this statute it
appears that Congress is of the opinion that any portion of the Army confined to field training in the
United States should be treated as “in the field.” There are other statutes almost too numerous to
mention which clearly indicate that troops in cantonments in this country are “in the field.”55
It would seem logical that if military bases inside of the United States are considered “in
the field,” then military bases outside of the United States would certainly qualify as well, especially
given that the availability for trial under an Article III court would presumably be much more
difficult in the latter, and indeed, this is what the court found.56
In United States v. Burney, a 1956 case of a civilian military contractor serving with the Air
Force overseas, the Court of Military Appeals held that the contractor’s trial by court-martial was
constitutional.57 When taking on the definition of “in the field,” the court upheld the definition
set forth in Hines.58 Although debatably “an area of actual fighting” may imply an action, it clearly
limits the scope to a specific location, and therefore does not agree with the finding in Hines.59 If “in
the field” is relevant to activity and not location, the definition adopted by the Ali court not only
falls short of precedent, but also strips commanders of authority to court-martial contractors serving
under their supervision when issues arise outside of an area of actual fighting.60
53 See id. at 31 (emphasis added).
54 See 10 U.S.C. § 802 Article 2(a)(10); Delaware Consulting Group, supra note 19 (explaining that the 101
articles passed by the UCMJ were written over a century before Hines was decided).
55 Hines, 259 F. 28 at 34.
56 See id. at 33 (holding that “those who entered the cantonment took the first step which was to lead them to the
firing line, and they were then as much ‘in the field’ in pursuance of such training as those who were encamped on the
fields of Flanders awaiting orders to enter the engagement”).
57 See United States v. Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98, 127 (C.M.A. 1956) (holding that it is unconstitutional for former
members of the military to be court-martialed).
58 Id. at 109 ( “The phrase ‘in the field’ has been taken to imply military operations with a view to an enemy and
the question of whether an armed force is ‘in the field’ is determined by the activity in which it may be engaged at a
particular time, not by the locality in which it may be found.”) (internal quotations omitted).
59 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 264 (differing from Hines because the Hines court held that the term in the
field applies broadly to any persons of the military or accompanying the military within or without the United States no
matter if actual fighting is occurring).
60 See id. (ruling that “‘in the field’ . . . requires an area of actual fighting”); but see Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98 at 103
(stating that “the phrase ‘in the field’ . . . is determined by the activity in which it may be engaged at a particular time,
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Armies of the United States in the field”).
64 See id. at 255 (explaining that “in the field” refers to “any place, whether on land or water, apart from permanent
cantonments or fortifications, where military operations are being conducted”) (citing Ex Parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616, 617
(1917)).
65 See Ex parte Mikell, 253 F. 817 (E.D.S.C. 1918) (stating that “in the field” does not include areas thousands of
miles removed and where there is no military conflict); Hines, 259 F. 28 (holding that the term “in the field” may only be
determined by the scope of activity that is being engaged in and not by the locality).
66 See U.S., Australian Joint Forces to Conduct Talisman Saber Exercise, U.S. Pac. Fleet Pub. Aff., July 9, 2013, http://
www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/010131 (describing a joint military exercise carried out by U.S. and Australian forces, in a
field training area, outside of an area of actual fighting).
67 10 U.S.C. § 802 Article 2(a)(10); see Navy Sub Mapping Arctic Ocean Seafloor, Envtl. News Network (July 1,
1998) http://www.cnn.com/TECH/science/9807/01/arctic.yoto/ (illustrating a U.S. Navy expedition to map Arctic
Ocean seabed which will provide scientists with three-dimensional images); see also Barbra Starr, General Asks for U.S.
Warships in Typhoon Relief, CNN, Nov. 13, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/12/us/philippines-typhoon-aid/index.
html (describing the U.S. Marines’ humanitarian aid mission following typhoon Hayian in 2013 to provide shelter,
food, water, and sanitation to thousands of displaced people); French, US Forces Detain 12 Suspected Somali Pirates,
NDTV, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/french-us-forces-detain-12-suspected-somali-pirates-314936
(highlighting a U.S. warship’s presence off the Somali coast to patrol, deter, and if necessary, detain suspected enemy
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68 See Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 264 (defining “in the field” as “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field
during a contingency operation”).
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Burney, it would logically follow that a military contractor accompanying the armed forces in any
area that is or may become involved in war operations during a contingency operation is by the very
nature of the activity “in the field.”69
II. Erdmann’s Opinion in Ali and the Repercussions of Expanding “In the Field”
In Ali, Judge Erdmann, relied on Colonel Winthrop and the Burney court in adopting a
definition of “in the field.”70 He stated, “[w]e see no reason not to adopt [the Burney] interpretation
of ‘in the field,’ which requires an area of actual fighting, for our analysis of Article 2(a)(10).”71
The CAAF considered Ali to be serving with the armed forces “in the field” and his trial by courtmartial was held to be valid on additional grounds.72 However, it is not the result of the case, but
the rational that is of concern in this analysis. The CAAF’s opinion in Ali does not necessarily go
in detail as to whether the UCMJ could apply to a contractor who is outside of the area of “actual
fighting.”73
A. On the Theatre Of War
In Ali, the government referenced Winthrop in his description of “in the field.”74 The full
excerpt from Military Law and Precedents reads:
Further, the use of the terms ‘to the camp,’ ‘in the field,’ ‘according to
the rules and discipline of war,’ is deemed clearly to indicate that the
application of the Article is confined both to the period and pendency
of war and to acts committed on the theatre of the war.
This broad definition does not completely agree with the courts adoption of the Hines definition
of an “area of actual fighting.”75 A closer examination of what Winthrop meant by the “theatre of
war,” reveals a greater scope than simply the “area of actual fighting.”76 In part of the same passage
69 See United States v. Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98 at 103 (stating that ‘in the field’ will not be determined by the locality
but by the activity in which it may be engaged at that time); Hines, 259 F. 28 at 31 (agreeing with Burney by interpreting
“in the field” to encompass military bases within the United States and outside of the United States); Ex parte Gerlach,
247 F. 616 at 617 (defining “in the field” as “any place, whether on land or water, apart from permanent cantonments or
fortifications, where military operations are being conducted”).
70 See Ali, 71 M.J. at 264.
71 Id.
72 See id. (finding that Congress had constitutional authority to create a provision subjecting persons accompanying an
armed force in the field during a contingency operation to military jurisdiction).
73 See id. (holding only that where there is actual fighting, an individual accompanying or serving with an armed force
is “in the field”).
74 See id. at 264 (“Colonel Winthrop broadly defined the phrase to mean the ‘period and pendency of war and to acts
committed in the theatre of war.’”).
75 See Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 264 (“[I]n the field means in an area of actual fighting . . . .”) (citing United States v. Burney,
21 C.M.R. 98, 109-10 (C.M.A. 1956)).
76 See Winthrop, supra note 16, at 101 (outlining his understanding of “theatre of war”).
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where the aforementioned excerpt is derived, Winthrop gives an example of a situation that took
place during a period of hostilities with the American Indians, in which a quartermaster’s clerk was
arrested on a charge of fraud against the government.77 At the time of his arrest, the civilian clerk was
serving with the Army within the proximity of the enemy but “with whom no hostilities whatever
were at the time pending.”78 A similar situation may exist today, with respect to contingency
operations lacking the characteristics of conventional war, where greater jurisdiction is needed over
military contractors.79 In citing this example, Winthrop admits that it is not always easy to determine
if an offence occurred in the “theatre of war.”80
Additionally, Winthrop states that “in the field” encompasses both “the period and pendency
of war and . . . acts committed on the theatre of the war.”81 Merriam-Webster defines theatre of war
as “the entire land, sea, and air area that is or may become involved directly in war operations.”82 A
similar definition is given by Lieutenant General Richardson in Duncan v. Kahanamoku:
[A]n active theatre of war is that area which is or may become actively
involved in the conduct of the war. A theatre of operations is that
part of an active war theatre which is needed for the operations either
offensively or defensively, according to the missions assigned or a
combination of the missions; and it includes also the administrative
agencies which are necessary for the conduct of those opperations [sic.].83
The Merriam-Webster and Lt. Gen. Richardson definitions give a broad scope to the meaning of the
“theatre of war.” Understanding the “theatre of war” in this way gives a much broader spectrum
of jurisdiction to Winthrop’s definition of “in the field” than the Ali court’s narrow adoption of an
“area of actual fighting.”84 Essentially, any act in violation of the UCMJ by a military contractor,
while accompanying the armed forces during a contingency operation, that occurs anywhere
war operations may be involved would be considered “in the field” and susceptible to UCMJ
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Cf. id. (arguing that “[a] period of hostilities with Indians is, equally with a period of warfare against a foreign
power, a ‘time of war;’ and it has been specifically held by the Attorney General that civil employees of the War
Department—‘serving with the army in the Indian country during offensive or defensive operations against the Indians’
are amenable to military trial for offences committed pending such service”). But see id. (concerning Indian wars, “the
jurisdiction created . . . should be extended with special caution over civilians serving with troops during an Indian war,
for the reason that the theatre of such a war is commonly restricted in extent and that its duration is ordinarily but brief
as compared with other wars’”) (emphasis added).
80 See id. (“[I]t may not always readily be determined whether a war was in a proper sense pending at the date of the
offence, or whether the locus of the offence was, properly speaking, the theatre of such a war.”).
81 Id.
82 Theater of War Definition, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1221 (10th ed. 1998).
83 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 344 n.3 (1946) (testimony of Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., U.S.A.,
Commanding General of the Central Pacific Area); but see United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F 2012)
(“Experts on military law, the Judge Advocate General and the Attorney General have repeatedly taken the position that
‘in the field’ means in an area of actual fighting.”) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 34 n.61 (1957)).
84 Id.
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jurisdiction.85
Furthermore, during times of conflict around the world, especially with the War on
Terror currently underway, all deployed armed forces may be “in the field” but not necessarily in
the “theatre of war.”86 It is also conceivable that armed forces engaged in mission preparation or
training operations within the United States may be considered “in the field” during a contingency
operation.87 However, subjecting civilian military contractors to military courts, within the United
States, and not during a time of martial law, would be more difficult to justify given the availability
of Article III courts within the homeland.88
Naturally, the aforementioned conclusion will raise deep concern from proponents of a more
limited allocation of judicial power over civilians by military courts; such was the case in Covert.89
However, in Covert the civilians being tried were dependents of members of the armed service
accompanying the military overseas during a “time of peace,” and in cases such as United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles and Milligan the accused were either not connected with military service or
were ex-military being tried for accusations which occurred during the time of prior service.90 The
question being analyzed here involves military contractors during a contingency operation, not a
time of peace. This distinction is important to make because of the essential role military contractors
provide to military units around the world, especially during contingency operations.91 Indeed,
without military contractors, a military unit may be rendered incapable of carrying out its mission;
because of this, it is of utmost importance that commanders have full power to court-martial
contractors accompanying their unit.92
85 See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450–51 (1987) (holding that jurisdiction of a court-martial depends
solely on the accused’s status as member of armed forces, and not on “service connection” of the offense charged); see also
Covert, 354 U.S. at 22–23 (1957) (“[W]e need not attempt here to precisely define the boundary between ‘civilians’ and
members of the ‘land and naval Forces.’ We recognize that there might be circumstances where a person could be ‘in’
the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not
wear a uniform.”).
86 See Hines, 259 at 33 (“In time of war, with some exceptions, practically the entire army is ‘in the field,’ but not
necessarily ‘in the theater of operation’”).
87 See id. (“[W]e can conceive of no reason why the army in America engaged in training and preparing for service
on the firing line overseas should not be considered and treated as a component part of the entire army, the majority of
whom were actually engaged on the firing line.”).
88 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding that citizens not connected with military service cannot
be tried by a military court when Article III courts are available).
89 See Covert, 354 U.S. at 35 (“[W]e reject the Government’s argument that present threats to peace permit military
trial of civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas in an area where no actual hostilities are under way. The
exigencies which have required military rule on the battlefront are not present in areas where no conflict exists. Military
trial of civilians ‘in the field’ is an extraordinary jurisdiction and it should not be expanded at the expense of the Bill of
Rights.”).
90 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (rejecting court-martial jurisdiction over civilian
ex-service member for accusations supposedly committed during his time of service); Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 17
(involving a citizen who had never been a part of the armed forces or a resident of Confederate state); Covert, 354 U.S. at
45 (“[I]t is only the trial of civilian dependents in a capital case in time of peace that is in question.”).
91 See Chapman, supra note 41, at 1059 (discussing the pros and cons of the increasingly ubiquitous use of military
contractors in combat zones).
92 Cf. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 275 (C.A.A.F 2012) (recounting how the absence of a military contractor
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B. Negative Repercussions of Expanding In the Field
A broader application of the Article 2(a)(10) “in the field” language would undeniably
deprive civilian contractors of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial in an Article III
court for crimes committed in a wider arena than simply “an area of actual fighting.”93 Additionally,
expanding the definition may potentially invite abuse from commanding officers seeking to apply
military judicial remedies to cases that may be wholly unrelated to the success of a mission.94 Courts
have been appropriately cautious when setting the limits of military jurisdictions over civilians.95
Should the Supreme Court ever weigh in on a sound definition of “in the field,” it would also likely
do so with great caution.96
Much literature has been devoted to the debate over the constitutionality of Article 2(a)
(10) as a whole; however, less has been written over the extent of jurisdiction to which “in the field”
encompasses.97 Depriving a U.S. citizen of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights is an enormous
power. This depravation is an obvious consequence of military jurisdiction over crimes committed
by U.S. citizens serving with or accompanying the armed forces “in the field” and would stretch even
further should “in the field” be defined as any location where military operations could commence.98
Therefore, the means must justify the end. Depriving a private citizen of her Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights must be justified as vital to the interests of the military in any given mission.
Such a determination may be made by distinguishing the types of civilian persons who should fall
under military jurisdiction while accompanying or serving with the armed forces and the activities
they perform “in the field.”99
The Status Test, as outlined in Covert, attempted to clarify Congress’ power to circumscribe
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by limiting its jurisdiction to do so strictly over members of the
who had performed translation rendered the U.S. Army unit he was serving with “mission incapable” for five days).
93 See Covert, 354 U.S. at 34 n.61 (“We believe that Art. 2(10) sets forth the maximum historically recognized extent
of military jurisdiction over civilians under the concept of ‘in the field.’”).
94 See id. at 1 (holding that UCMJ jurisdiction over civilian dependents of service members in peace time was
unconstitutional).
95 See id. at 21 (“By way of contrast the jurisdiction of military tribunals is a very limited and extraordinary jurisdiction
derived from the cryptic language in Art. I, § 8, and, at most, was intended to be only a narrow exception to the normal
and preferred method of trial in courts of law.”) (emphasis added).
96 See generally Kara M. Sacilotto, Jumping the (Un)constitutional Gun?: Constitutional Questions in the Application of
the UCMJ to Contractors, 37 Pub. Cont. L.J. 179, 211 (2008) (describing the potential unconstitutionality of extending
UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians while Article III courts are open).
97 See generally Brittany Warren, The Case of the Murdering Wives: Reid v. Covert and the Complicated Question of
Civilians and Courts-Martial, 212 MIL. L. REV. 133 (2012) (arguing against the use of UCMJ over civilians); see
also Anna Manasco Dionne, “In Time of Whenever the Secretary Says”: The Constitutional Case Against Court-Martial
Jurisdiction over Accompanying Civilians During Contingency Operations, 27 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 205 (2008) (discussing
reasons why the UCMJ should not apply to civilians during a contingency operation); The Case for Court-Martial
Jurisdiction over Civilians Under Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Army Law, Oct./Nov. 2002, at 31
(making the case for UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces in the field).
98 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F 2012).
99 Compare Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (considering UCMJ jurisdiction over civilian dependents), with Ali, 71
M.J. at 258 (examining UCMJ jurisdiction over non-national civilian contractor providing a critical service in the field).
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armed forces.100 It is an uphill argument to assert that dependents of servicemembers fall into the
latter category. However, it is much more convincing to assert that private military contractors,
when serving with the armed forces “in the field,” by characterization of the services they provide.101
Nevertheless, subjecting said contractors to military jurisdiction under an expanded umbrella of
“in the field” would indeed deprive them of a jury trial in an Article III court for crimes committed
outside of “an area of actual fighting.”
Civilians accompanying the armed forces during a time of declared war or contingency
operation are subject to the authority of a commissioned military officer when Article 2(a)(10)
applies, and therefore, exposed to said officer’s potential mishandling of jurisdictional power.102
This is a large reality that is of utmost concern with an expanded understanding of “in the field.”
It would certainly not meet the ends of mission success if a civilian dependent, accompanying a
servicemember during a time of declared war or contingency operation, were subjected to the means
of a court-martial for an offense wholly unrelated to the mission of the unit.103
Although there are extensive safeguards in place to prevent abuse of power within the UCMJ,
these safeguards may not prevent a commander from choosing to try a civilian under the UCMJ
when an Article III court would be more appropriate for said person, and the alleged crime.104
Indeed there have been scenarios where civilians have been wrongfully brought before a court-martial
within the past century.105 However, the United States’ increased dependency on civilian military
100 See Covert, 354 U.S. at 19–20 (limiting Congressional power over “land and naval forces” to include only members
of the armed services and not their civilian wives, children, or other dependents).
101 See id. at 22–23 (“[W]e need not attempt here to precisely define the boundary between ‘civilians’ and members
of the ‘land and naval Forces.’ We recognize that there might be circumstances where a person could be ‘in’ the armed
services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a
uniform.”); see also Cullen, supra note 20, at 513–14 (describing the different types of military contractors and services
they provide, highlighting the security contractor and the high potential of ‘use of force’ they may administer).
102 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 802, 822–26.
103 See Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (holding that “the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice extending courtmartial jurisdiction to persons accompanying the armed forces outside the continental limits of the United States could
not be constitutionally applied to trial of civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas, in times of peace,
for capital offenses”).
104 See Military Justice Fact Sheets: The Military Justice System, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual
for Courts Martial, Headquarters Marine Corps, http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/135/MJFACTSHTS[1].
html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (stating that “there are extensive safeguards to protect against abuse of authority. In the
opinion of many legal scholars, the UCMJ has not only kept pace with innovations in civilian criminal jurisprudence,
but has actually led the way, establishing more safeguards to protect the rights of those accused of criminal offenses. The
UCMJ and MCM are primarily kept current with the basic principles of American jurisprudence through two standing
committees, The Code Committee and the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice.”).
105 See Katherine Jackson, Not Quite A Civilian, Not Quite A Soldier: How Five Words Could Subject Civilian
Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military Jurisdiction, 27 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 255, 255–56 (2007)
(stating that “sorting out when civilians can and cannot be subject to court-martial jurisdiction, the situation the United
States now faces seems entirely unprecedented. Contractors today serve in capacities that make them a hybrid as yet
untested under the Constitution—the civilian-soldier. They are not soldiers, but they are not quite civilians either . . . [t]
heir work represents greater military and political efficiency and efficacy in many ways. It also represents a development
that the civilian criminal justice system has not been well equipped to deal with.” (citing Griff Witte, New Law Could
Subject Civilians to Military Trial: Provision Aimed at Contractors, but Some Fear it Will Sweep Up Other Workers, Wash.
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contractors in modern times highlights an issue that is unprecedented, at least in its own history.106
Understanding the most obvious potential negative repercussions a wider interpretation of “in
the field” may create, and considering the growing privatization of warfare, the benefits of a wider
interpretation far outweigh the cost to civil liberty civilian contractors would have to pay for wrongs
committed while accompanying or serving with the armed forces “in the field.”107 Indeed, in order
to ensure discipline, unit readiness, accountability, and justice “in the field” during a contingency
operation, a broader interpretation is needed to fulfill the purpose of Article 2(a)(10).108
III. Constitutional Justification For the Use of UCMJ Jurisdiction Over Military
Contractors “In the Field” But Not Necessarily in “An Area of Actual Fighting.”
Interpreting the scope of the Article 2(a)(10) language “in the field” as encompassing
any area that is or may become involved in war operations, is amongst other things, within the
enumerated and implied war powers given to Congress by the United States Constitution.109 In
past cases dealing with military trials of civilian contractors, serious questions have been raised as to
those contractors’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury.110 The Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
Post, Jan. 15, 2007, at A1; Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian
Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 Pub. Cont. L.J. 233, 263 (Winter 2000); Jason McLure, Abuse Case Prosecution Falls
Apart: Evidence of Alleged Rape by Iraq Contractor Elusive, 29 Legal Times 1, May 29, 2006, at 1).
106 See Jackson, supra note 105, at 255 (noting the current legal framework does not fit the changing face and role of
the civilian contractor used by the U.S. military today).
107 See generally P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 521 (2004) (discussing the rise and use of the privatized military industry in the 21st century).
See generally Katherin J. Chapman, Note, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1047, 1079 (2010) (discussing the needs and benefits of
holding private military contractors accountable for their actions under the UCMJ when serving with the U.S. armed
forces during a contingency operation in the field).
108 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (applying the statute too persons “serving with or accompanying” military forces in the
field during war or contingency operations).
109 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (“The Congress shall have Power To ...make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . .”); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 273 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (tracing the
source of Congressional power in this sense beyond the Rules and Regulations Clause and pointing to, among other
powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 346 n. 3 (1946) (testimony of Lt.
Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., U.S.A., then Commanding General of the Central Pacific Area) (stating the theater of
operations includes areas necessary for offensive or defensive operations).
110 See Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (declining to authorize the prosecution of a
dependent wife of a soldier stationed in Germany for a noncapital offense); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (declining
to extend the power to dependent wives of soldiers stationed overseas during times of peace for capital offenses); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (extending the protections to ex-servicemen); Hines v. Mikell, 259 F.
28 (4th Cir. 1919) (dealing with a civilian contractor); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (affirming defendant’s prosecution
because he was accompanying or serving with the army in the theater); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F
2012) (discussing application to a foreign national working as a contractor in the theater of war in Iraq); United States
v. Averette (1990), 41 C.M.R. 363 (finding “in the time of war” to mean a war declared by Congress); United States v.
Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98 (C.M.A 1956) (noting the accused was a civilian employee stationed abroad with the military in
Japan).
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committed while accompanying or serving with the armed forces “in the field.”107 Indeed, in order
to ensure discipline, unit readiness, accountability, and justice “in the field” during a contingency
operation, a broader interpretation is needed to fulfill the purpose of Article 2(a)(10).108
III. Constitutional Justification For the Use of UCMJ Jurisdiction Over Military
Contractors “In the Field” But Not Necessarily in “An Area of Actual Fighting.”
Interpreting the scope of the Article 2(a)(10) language “in the field” as encompassing
any area that is or may become involved in war operations, is amongst other things, within the
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Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 521 (2004) (discussing the rise and use of the privatized military industry in the 21st century).
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right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”111
If “in the field” involves a locus outside of any state and district, and a crime is committed
there by a contractor, does the Sixth Amendment apply? For the purposes of this analysis and its
inquiry into military contractors serving with the armed forces “in the field,” the Fifth Amendment
exception clause may provide a remedy to this dilemma. Furthermore, focusing on the controversial
Fifth Amendment exception and interpreting it in an extensive scope provides what is perhaps the
most compelling argument for a broader understanding of “in the field” than the one articulated in
Ali.112
A. The Fifth Amendment Exception Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants the right of trial by jury
to any person who “shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,” unless
certain exceptions exist.113 These exceptions are cases “arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”114 It is important to note that the
Fifth Amendment does not list the “arising in” exception as applying only to the armed forces.115
Irrefutably, the language unambiguously states “no person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces.”116 Therefore, if a crime is committed by a person, such as a
civilian contractor, and it “arises in” the land or naval forces, said contractor may be exempt from
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment jury provisions.117 Indeed, this is exactly what the UCMJ under
Article 2(a)(10) provides.118 Respecting the question being analyzed here, a crime “arising in” the
land and naval forces must logically comprise one committed by a contractor accompanying or
serving with the armed forces “in the field,” and would therefore fall under the Fifth Amendment
exception clause.
Scholars have alluded that certain jurisprudence may be correct in arguing that cases “arising
in” the land or naval forces should be, at least, limited to cases involving actual service members of
said forces.119 Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court in U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles reasoned
111 U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added).
112 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author)
(analyzing the jurisprudence, controversy, and consequences of military courts).
113 U.S. Const. amend. V.
114 Id.
115 See id. (noting the phrase arising in applies to all the clauses that follow from “land” through “public danger”).
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 270 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (affirming the lower court’s decision).
118 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
119 See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) (stating that “the word ‘arise,’ ‘to proceed, to issue, to spring,’ and a
case arising in the land or naval forces upon a fair and reasonable construction of the whole article, appears to us to be
a case proceeding, issuing or springing from acts in violation of the naval laws and regulations committed while in the
naval forces or service”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, at 22 (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript on file
with author) (discussing Justice Black’s opinion in Toth).
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that the natural meaning of “to make rules . . . [to regulate] the land and naval forces” necessarily
applies to those who are “actually members or part of the armed forces.”120 Justice Black also
noted that the language of the make rules clause “would seem” to restrict Courts-martial to service
members, and that “[t]here is compelling reason for construing the clause this way.”121 However,
in Covert, Justice Black recognized that a person could be a part of the armed services but not
necessarily inducted therein.122 Could it not be said that a military contractor serving with a military
unit during a contingency operation “in the field” meets this threshold? The answer may be found
by applying the closeness test in Kinsella.123 There, Justice Harlan argued in his dissent that:
[T]he true issue on this aspect of all such cases concerns the closeness
or remoteness of the relationship between the person affected and the
military establishment . . . [i]s [whether] that relationship close enough
so that Congress may, in light of all the factors involved, appropriately
deem it ‘necessary’ that the military be given jurisdiction to deal with
offenses committed by such persons[.]124
Based upon actions alone, a military contractor may easily pass the aforementioned closeness test
and be found necessarily within the jurisdiction of the military when serving with the armed forces
“in the field.” The Constitution has given Congress the power to make rules regulating the land and
naval forces, and for non-Article III courts to hear cases arising therein.125 In Ali, the CAAF held
that a civilian contractor accompanying a unit “in the field” was sufficient for military jurisdiction.126
Accordingly, in the context of Article 2(a)(10), a case arising “in the field” must also “arise in” the
land and naval forces. Furthermore, given that the UCMJ governs the land and naval forces, it
would not seem within the spirit of Article 2(a)(10) for a case arising within it to not “arise in” the
land and naval forces.127
B. Necessary and Proper War Powers
Given that Congress has the power for non-Article III courts to hear cases, and that “in the
field,” within the context of Article 2(a)(10), necessarily “arises in” the land and naval forces, it must
follow that a broader jurisdiction of “in the field” is both essential and within the constitutional
120 See Toth, 350 U.S. at 15 (stating that “for given its natural meaning, the power granted Congress ‘To make Rules’
to regulate ‘the land and naval Forces’ would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually
members or part of the armed forces”).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 35.
123 See Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
124 Id. at 257 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (“To provide and maintain a Navy”).
126 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 270 (C.A.A.F. 2012) ( “We hold that Ali falls within the scope of Article
2(a)(10) and that the congressional exercise of jurisdiction, as applied to Ali, a non-United States citizen Iraqi national,
subject to court-martial outside the United States during a contingency operation, does not violate the Constitution.”).
127 10 U.S.C. § 802 art. 2(a)–(e).
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civilian contractor, and it “arises in” the land or naval forces, said contractor may be exempt from
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment jury provisions.117 Indeed, this is exactly what the UCMJ under
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land and naval forces must logically comprise one committed by a contractor accompanying or
serving with the armed forces “in the field,” and would therefore fall under the Fifth Amendment
exception clause.
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124 Id. at 257 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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powers of Congress to define.128 A broader scope of “in the field” is needed given scenarios such as
the one raised here: a United States citizen, serving as a contractor with the United States armed
forces outside of the United States and its territories, during a contingency operation.
Congress may justify allowing UMCJ jurisdiction over military contractors, serving with the
armed forces, in locations outside of the “area of actual fighting,” and during a declared war, through
Congress’ war powers. In Ali, Judge Erdmann referenced Covert where the Supreme Court held that
Congress’ war powers give it the authority to subject civilians preforming services for the military
“in the field” (during a time of war) to courts-martial jurisdiction.129 In Covert, Justice Black further
stated that:
[T]o the extent that these cases can be justified . . . trial of persons
who were not ‘members’ of the armed forces . . . must rest on the
Government’s ‘war powers.’ In the face of an actively hostile enemy,
military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the
battlefront. From a time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the
extraordinary circumstances present in an area of actual fighting have
been considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in
that area by military courts under military rules.130
However, in Covert, Justice Black’s response was to the government’s argument for UCMJ
jurisdiction over civilians during a time where “threats to peace” existed, not a declared war
or contingency operation.131 Justice Black’s reasoning in Covert does not necessarily rule out a
scenario where “the field” may include locations outside of the area of actual fighting, in such
a circumstance, UCMJ jurisdiction may provide the same benefits it has on the battlefront of
traditional wars.132 Indeed, in his opinion in Youngstown, Justice Black recognized that the “theatre
of war” is an expanding concept.133 Therefore, it is not only conceivable, but within Congress’ war
powers to define “in the field” as both encompassing areas of actual fighting as well as areas outside
of actual fighting when a military contractor is accompanying a military unit during a contingency
128 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; U.S. Const. amend. V; 10 U.S.C. § 802 art. 2(a)–(e); see Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (“To the extent that these cases can be justified, insofar as they involved trial of persons who were not
‘members’ of the armed forces, they must rest on the Government’s ‘war powers.”) (citing Perlstein v. United States, 151
F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1945)); see also Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28; Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 269 (“We hold that Ali falls within the
scope of Article 2(a)(10) and that the congressional exercise of jurisdiction, as applied to Ali, a non-United States citizen
Iraqi national, subject to court-martial outside the United States during a contingency operation, does not violate the
Constitution.”).
129 See Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 269 (holding that a non-United States citizen, falls within the scope of Article 2(a)(10) and
that the congressional exercise of jurisdiction, subject to court-martial outside the United States during a contingency
operation, does not violate the Constitution).
130 Covert, 354 U.S. at 21 (citing Perlstein, 151 F.2d 167).
131 See id. at 35 (“We reject the Government’s argument that present threats to peace permit military trial of civilians
accompanying the armed forces overseas in an area where no actual hostilities are under way.”) (emphasis added).
132 See Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 264 (“[C]olonel Winthrop broadly defined the phrase to mean ‘the period and pendency of
war and to acts committed in the theater of war.”).
133 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
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Congress may further derive its authority for a broader jurisdiction of “in the field” through
the Necessary and Proper clause.135 Article I § 8, of course, gives power to Congress “to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [its] foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by [the] Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”136 Surely the Department of Defense is included in “any Department”
and given that the UCMJ was created to govern cases arising in the land and naval forces, Congress
has the power to broaden the jurisdiction of the Article 2(a)(10) language “in the field.”137
Furthermore, a broadening of the jurisdiction of “in the field” would be a non-frivolous
extension of current precedent which has already passed the constitutional test.138 In Ali, the CAAF
held that Congress, through its war powers, may subject persons to the UCMJ when serving with
the armed forces in the field during a contingency operation.139 As mentioned previously, the Ali
court relied on the Supreme Court in Covert in coming to this conclusion.140 Therefore, the debate
over Congress’ power to subject civilian contractors to military courts within the context of Article
2(a)(10) is all but settled, remaining unsettled is a firm understanding of “in the field” when applied
to modern conflicts. Although reasonable minds may differ as to how “in the field” should be
interpreted, it may be agreed that if Congress holds the constitutional power to implement Article
2(a)(10), they must also have the ability to define the scope of the language set forth within it. Given
the aforementioned reasons, it is probable that interpreting “in the field” as anywhere that war
operations may be involved and not limited to “an area of actual fighting,” although controversial, is
constitutional.
Conclusion
In summary, the United States is continuing to fight unconventional wars, dissimilar from
conventional conflicts; this battlefield seems to know no bounds. Indeed, the contingency operations
being fought today bring forward new complications that challenge doctrinal warfare, among these
134 E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 802 art. 2(a)(10).
135 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
136 Id. (emphasis added).
137 See 10 U.S.C. § 802 art. 2(a)–(e) (defining persons who are subject to this chapter as the armed and naval forces);
id. at art. 2(a)(10).
138 Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (holding that the UCMJ may not be extended to dependents of service
members accompanying the armed forces overseas during a time of peace but not discussing its application to persons
serving with or accompanying the armed forces during a time of declared war or contingency operation).
139 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 269 (“Thus, there have been a number of decisions by lower courts during
the twentieth century upholding court-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying or serving with the armed forces
“in the field.”).
140 Cf. Covert, 354 U.S. at 22 (holding that “it is a persuasive and reliable indication that the authority conferred
by Clause 14 [of the U.S. Constitution] does not encompass persons who cannot fairly be said to be ‘in’ the military
service”).
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are the expanding frontiers of the “theatre of war” and the continued reliance on civilian contractors
who provide a cheap yet expert array of services to our armed forces.141 How these civilian
contractors will be held to answer for crimes they commit while accompanying the armed forces
during these contingency operations is an evolving issue. However, given the historical precedent
outlined above, and the need for a broader definition, a United States citizen, serving as a contractor
with the United States armed forces, outside of the United States and its territories, during a
contingency operation, may fall under the jurisdiction of the UCMJ for a crime committed outside
of an “area of actual fighting” but nevertheless “in the field,” pursuant to Article 2(a)(10).
The provision of a swift and effective system of justice over civilian contractors when Article
III courts are either not available, or export of violators for trial under them would impede the
objectives of an overall mission, is greatly within the interest of the United States. Article 2(a)(10)
of the UCMJ fills the gap in jurisdiction created between Article III and military courts respecting
civilians accompanying or serving with the military in the field during a time of declared war or
contingency operation.142 Congress’ authority to create such a law has been deemed within the
constitutional authority given to it under numerous clauses.143 However, in the most recent opinion
on the issue, the Ali court interprets “in the field” much too narrowly.144 A broader understanding of
the “in the field” language must exist to permit for the necessary jurisdiction of military courts over
civilian contractors accompanying the armed forces during the modern contingency operations the
United States is currently engaged in, and will likely be engaged in for the foreseeable future.
In the 1956 case United States v. Burney145 concerning a civilian contractor who was courtmartialed for an offense committed while serving with the armed forces, Judge Latimer, delivering
the opinion of the court, impeccably illustrated the reasoning behind the need for Article 2(a)(10):
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fertile source of valuable intelligence data for the enemy. They receive
benefits and protection from the military arm while performing
their tasks, and their efforts are essential to the accomplishment of
the military mission. The security of the nation may depend on their
activities, and they should answer to their immediate protector for any
transgressions. They need not volunteer for the service, but once they do,
they willingly place themselves in an assignment where the success or failure
of the mission of the particular armed force may be governed by their
conduct, behavior, and strict compliance with orders. It is just as necessary
that they be governed by the demands of the military situation as the
very troops they serve. Even a premature disclosure of their presence
in an area may awaken an enemy to the presence of American combat
troops. It is not too much, then, to demand obedience to military law
from them, and to conclude that they must be subject to the provisions
of the Code, albeit they are civilians who—when tried by a military
court—are denied a trial by jury.146
In the spirit of the latter, and given the aforementioned reasons, a broader scope of “in the field” encompassing anywhere that war operations may be involved is necessary to ensure the success of missions carried out by the armed forces and the crucial support network of civilian contractors whom
accompany and serve with them, more so now than ever, “in the field.”

Putting aside the authorities and military customs existing from
time immemorial and discussed above, there is a sound core of logic
underlying the principle that, in time of conflict, persons serving with or
accompanying the armed forces, whether within or without the United
States and its territories, must be subject to control by the services
and to trial by court-martial. Those persons move with and often
support combat troops. They may perform laborious tasks, technical
maintenance work, administrative duties, or logistical functions,
and failure on their part to perform their duty may be disastrous. In
addition, they acquire much valuable information and they may be a
141 See generally Cullen, supra note 20, at 514 (discussing the practical limits of jurisdiction under UCMJ article 2(a)).
142 See 10 U.S.C. § 802 art. 2(a)(10).
143 10 U.S.C. § 822; see Covert, 354 U.S. at 21 (“In both cases jurisdiction was exercised by a military tribunal
pursuant to an Act of Congress authorizing such jurisdiction over all persons accompanying the armed forces outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The distinction that in one case the trial was by court-martial and in the other
by a military commission is insubstantial.”); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
144 See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F. 2012)(“We see no reason not to adopt this interpretation of
‘in the field,’ which requires an area of actual fighting, for our analysis of Article 2(a)(10).”).
145 United States v. Burney, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956).

146 See id. at 127 (holding that persons serving with or accompanying the armed forces, whether within or without the
United States and its territories, must be subject to control by the services and to trial by court-martial).
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